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Abstract
Part I of this Note will discuss briefly the history of the Passport Act and of travel control
statutes with an emphasis on the changing nature and purpose of passports. That section will also
review a significant case, decided in 1955 in which the power of the Secretary to deny a passport
was challenged. Part II will examine the rationale underlying the Kent v. Dulles decision. Finally,
Part III will focus on the Supreme Court’s treatment of the issues presented in Haig v. Agee and
will explore the effects of the Court’s decision on first and fifth amendment rights.
PASSPORT REVOCATION:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
HAIG V. AGEE AND THE POLICY TEST
INTRODUCTION
In 1978 Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) was amended to make it unlawful for an American to depart
from or enter the United States without a valid passport.' Prior to
the adoption of that amendment, passports were required only
during times of war or national emergency and even then, only
when the President proclaimed that travel restrictions were neces-
sary.2  Because such a proclamation had been in effect continu-
ously since 1952,3 the 1978 amendment worked no real change in a
United States citizen's need for a passport. The amendment is sig-
nificant, however, in that it marks the first occasion in this coun-
try's history that passports have been required during peacetime
without the trigger-mechanism of a Presidential proclamation. 4
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (Supp. III 1979). Section 215(b) states "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may
authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart
from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid
passport." Id. A citizen of the United States may not be denied entry nor face criminal
penalties for entry into the country for failure to carry a valid passport. See Worthy v. United
States, 328 F.2d 386, 394 (5th Cir. 1964). Section 215(c) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) had imposed criminal sanctions for failure to carry a valid passport. 8 U.S.C. §
1185(c) (1976). These were eliminated when the INA was amended in 1978. See Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 707(d), 92 Stat. 992-93
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (Supp. III 1979)). Currently, a citizen does not need a passport
to travel between parts of the United States as defined in 22 C.F.R. § 50.1 (1981) or between
the United States and adjacent countries (except Cuba). 22 C.F.R. § 53.2(a)-(b) (1981).
2. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 215(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)-(b)
(1976). That version of Section 215(a) of the INA, in effect from 1952 to 1978, provided that
the President could proclaim that travel restrictions were necessary when the nation was at
war or during the existence of a national emergency. Section 215(b) provided that when such
a proclamation was in force, it would be unlawful for citizens to depart from or enter the
United States without a valid passport. Satisfaction of the conditions set out in Section 215(a),
that is, the existence of war or national emergency and a presidential proclamation imposing
travel restrictions, triggered the operation of the passport requirement. When the nation was
not at war, two presidential proclamations were necessary to invoke Section 215(b) of the
INA; before a proclamation imposing travel restrictions could be effective, there had to be a
proclamation of the existence of a national emergency. Id. See notes 33 & 34 infra and
accompanying text.
3. See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 25, 30 & 32 infra and accompanying text.
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The Passport Act of 19265 (Passport Act) vests authority to
issue passports in the Secretary of State in accord with rules pre-
scribed by the President.' While the Passport Act does not ex-
pressly grant authority to either the Secretary or the President to
refuse to issue or to revoke a passport, its broad language has been
construed as giving the Secretary wide discretion in matters relating
to passports.7 The Secretary himself has consistently interpreted
the statute to include the power to deny and revoke passports. 8
The Secretary's power to revoke passports was recently chal-
lenged in Haig v. Agee.9 The Supreme Court held that the Pass-
port Act authorizes the Secretary to revoke passports on the grounds
that the holder's activities are causing or are likely to cause serious
damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United
States.' 0 The Court's decision altered the test for interpreting the
5. 22 U.S.C. §§ 211a-218 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
6. Id. § 211a (Supp. III 1979). Section 211a states, "[t]he Secretary of State may grant
and issue passports ... under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and
on behalf of the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such
passports." Id. In Executive Order No. 11,295, 3 C.F.R. 138 (1966 Compilation), the
President delegated to the Secretary of State the power to designate rules governing the
granting, issuing and verifying of passports.
7. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 349-50 (1939); Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938,
940 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218, 220 (D.D.C. 1955); Bauer v.
Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D.D.C. 1952); 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 264, at 467-70 (1942). The courts have recognized that the Secretary's discretion is
subject to due process and equal protection requirements. See Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F.
Supp. at 451. See also Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d at 944; notes 44 & 46 infra and
accompanying text.
8. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1958); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445,
448-49 (D.D.C. 1952); 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 511 (1901); 3 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 7,
§ 268; 3 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 512, at 920-23 (1906). The Secretary
has consistently promulgated rules which reflect his belief that he has the power to deny or
revoke a passport. See 22 C.F.R. § 53.8 (1949 Compilation) (reservation of discretion to
refuse to issue passports for purpose of restricting travel to certain countries); 22 C.F.R.
§§ 51.135, 51.136 (1957-1966) (refusal to issue passports to Communists and certain persons
whose activities abroad would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States); 22 C.F.R.
§§ 51.70-.71 (1980) lists the following six grounds upon which the Secretary may at his
discretion deny or revoke a passport: where the applicant has not repaid a loan received from
the United States to effectuate his return from a foreign country; where the applicant has
been delcared legally incompetent; where the applicant is under the age of 18; where the
applicant's activities abroad are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the
foreign policy of the United States; where the applicant's passport has been revoked and there
has been no change in circumstances to warrant issuance of a new passport; and where the
applicant is subject to a restraining order of the United States Armed Forces.
9. 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981).
10. Id. at 2783.
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Secretary's powers under the Passport Act which it had previously
established in Kent v. Dulles."
Part I of this Note will discuss briefly the history of the Pass-
port Act and of travel control statutes with an emphasis on the
changing nature and purpose of passports. That section will also
review a significant case, decided in 1955 in which the power of the
Secretary to deny a passport was challenged. Part II will examine
the rationale underlying the Kent v. Dulles decision. Finally, Part
III will focus on the Supreme Court's treatment of the issues pre-
sented in Haig v. Agee and will explore the effects of the Court's
decision on first and fifth amendment rights.
I. PASSPORTS AND THEIR REGULATION PRIOR TO
KENT V. DULLES
A. History of Passports 1856-1978
Traditionally, a passport has been defined as:
A document of identity and nationality issued to persons
owing allegiance to the United States and intending to travel or
sojourn in foreign countries. It indicates that it is the right of the
bearer to receive the protection and good offices of American
diplomatic and consular offices abroad and requests on the part
of the government of the United States that officials of foreign
governments permit the bearer to travel or sojourn in their
territories and in case of need to give him all lawful aid and
protection. It has no other purpose.12
11. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
12. 3 G. HACKWOirH, supra note 7, § 259, at 435. See 3 J. MooRE, supra note 8, at §
492; Ehrlich, Passports, 19 STAN. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (1966). See also Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy,
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 698 (1835) (characterizing a passport as a political document). It has
been thought, too, that the United States government would more readily assist its own
citizens abroad if they held passports. See 3 G. HACKWORTH, supra, § 264, at 470; 3 J. MooRE,
supra, § 492, at 859; but see Ehrlich, supra, at 120-30.
The United States defines a passport as a "travel document ... [which attests] to the
identity and nationality of the bearer." 22 C.F.R. § 51.1 (e) (1981). A United States passport
will be issued only to a national of the United States, 22 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1981), and only upon
proof of the applicant's nationality, 22 C.F.R. § 51.41 (1981). The applicant has the burden
of proving that he is a national of the United States. 22 C.F.R. § 51.40 (1981). A copy of a
birth certificate or certificate of naturalization or citizenship supplies sufficient evidence of
nationality to meet that burden of proof. 22 C.F.R. § 51.44 (1981). Although citizens retain
physical possession of passports, a United States passport remains the property of the United
States government at all times. 22 C.F.R. § 51.9 (1981).
1981]
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With the advent of travel control statutes requiring nationals to
obtain passports for travel outside the United States, however, a
passport has begun to serve another purpose; by identifying the
holder it has become a means of controlling exit from this coun-
try. 13  An understanding of the erosion of the distinction histori-
cally drawn between control over passports and control over
travel' 4 is thus a prerequisite to understanding the implications of
the Agee decision.
13. See Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In Lynd, the court noted
that historically the role of a passport was to identify the bearer as a United States national
entitled to the protection of American diplomatic officers abroad and to request foreign
governments to offer the bearer aid and protection. However, the court determined that the
primary function of a passport under Section 215 of the INA was "as an exit permit." Id. See
INA § 215(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)-(b) (1976). When a passport is characterized as an exit
permit, the power to withhold a passport from a citizen is equivalent to the power to deny
him exit for travel abroad. For a brief discussion of the Lynd court's response to this problem,
see note 14 infra.
14. See Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1967); See also Proposed Travel
Controls: Hearings on S3243 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the judici-
ary, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 56 (May 17, 18, 19, 1966) (remarks of Rep. Sourwine) (hereinafter
cited as 1966 Hearings on S3243). Representative Sourwine noted that passport regulation
did not become travel control until a passport was made a prerequisite of travel abroad.
In Lynd v. Rusk, the court examined the question whether and to what extent the
Secretary of State could enforce compliance with area restrictions on foreign travel. 389 F.2d
at 942. At the time, the Secretary had determined that travel to China, Cuba, North Korea;
North Vietnam and Syria would be inimical to the nation's foreign relations. Id. Lynd's
passport was tentatively withdrawn upon his return from North Vietnam; after an adminis-
trative hearing, final withdrawal was recommended because, although he promised not to
take a passport into a restricted area, Lynd refused to assure the Secretary that he would not
travel to restricted areas without a passport. Id. at 942-43. Stating that, although the
Secretary had the power to control the lawful travel of a passport, he did not have authority
to control the travel of the person, the court held that the SeCretary could not withhold
Lynd's passport because he failed to give assurances that he would not travel to restricted
areas without one. 389 F.2d at 947-49.
The case is important because it curtailed the Secretary's powers to restrict travel by
means of area restrictions. Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (Passport Act authorizes the
Secretary to restrict the validity of United States passports for travel to designated areas). In
1978, the Passport Act was amended by adding to Section 211a the sentence, "[U]nless
authorized by law, a passport may not be designated as restricted for travel to or for use in
any country other than a country with which the United States is at war, where armed
hostilities are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to the public health or the
physical safety of United States travellers." 22 U.S.C. § 211a (Supp. III 1979), codifying the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 94-426, 92 Stat. 971
(1978).
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1. Control Over Passports
Prior to 1856 responsibility for issuing passports did not rest in
any single branch of government.' 5 In addition to officers of the
federal government, state governors and other local authorities
routinely issued passports.'8  The Act of August 18, 1856,17 the
predecessor of the Passport Act of 1926, appears to have been
enacted primarily to end the practice of local issuance of pass-
ports.' 8 In language similar to that later adopted in the Passport
Act of 1926, it consolidated passport issuance in the Executive
branch of the federal government.'
Before Congress passed the first travel control statute in 1918,
a passport had been infrequently used as a means of controlling
travel. 20  Prior to 1918, a passport served primarily as an embodi-
15. See 3 J. MooRE, supra note 8, § 493, at 862; Special Committee to Study Passport
Procedures of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Freedom to Travel 5 (1958)
(hereinafter cited as Freedom to Travel).
16. 3 J. MooRE, supra note 8, § 493, at 862; Freedom to Travel, supra note 15, at 5-6.
The State Department itself was somewhat lax in asserting its authority in this area prior to
1856. The Department often delegated the authority to issue passports, permitting collectors
of customs and others to issue passports in their discretion. 3 J. MooRE, supra note 8, § 493, at
862.
17. Ch. 127, 11 Stat. 52 (1856).
18. Id. § 23, 11 Stat. 60-61 (1856). The act vested authority to issue passports in the
Secretary of State and made it a misdemeanor for anyone else to issue them. Id. The
legislative history of the act is scanty. It is worth noting, however, that prior to the passage of
the 1856 Act, foreign governments had begun to refuse to recognize locally issued passports.
See 3 J. MooRE, supra note 8, § 493, at 863; Freedom to Travel, supra note 15, at 6. Also,
prior to 1856, the Department of State recognized the desirability of establishing a uniform
practice of passport issuance. See 3 J. MooRE, supra note 8 § 493, at 863.
19. See 11 Stat. 60 (1856). The Act of 1856 reads, "[t]he Secretary of State shall be
authorized to grant and issue passports. . . under such rules as the President shall designate
and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States. ... Id. Compare the language of the
Act of 1856 with that of Section 211a of the Passport Act set out at note 6 supra. The Act was
revised in 1874 to read "[tihe Secretary of State may grant and issue passports ... under such
rules as the President shall designate for and on behalf of the United States." Rev. Stat. § 4075
(1875). Thus "shall" was changed to "may" in the 1874 codification.of federal law. See id.
There appears to be no legislative history of this change. See Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 at
2775 n.26. Apparently this is one of the inaccuracies for which the 1874 statutory revision is
notorious. See Dwan & Feidler, The Federal Statutes-Their History and Use, 22 MINN. L.
REv. 1008 at 1012 (1938). The Passport Act of 1926 adopted the language of the 1874
revision. See note 6 supra.
20. During the War of 1812, Congress required citizens traveling to enemy territory to
carry passports. Act of February 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 10, 3 Stat. 199 (1815). During the Civil
War, the Department of State issued a regulation which required persons going abroad to
carry passports. The regulation, issued on August 19, 1861, read:
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ment of a request to foreign powers to offer aid and protection to
the holder and as proof of the identity of the holder as a citizen of
the United States.2' Thus, the primary concerns of the State De-
partment in issuing passports at that time were the citizenship of
the applicant and his allegiance to the United States.2 2 Indeed, one
of the reasons for consolidating the issuance in the Executive branch
was to prevent non-citizens from obtaining passports. This practice
had lessened the reliability of United States passports.23 Passage of
the first travel control statute, and other statutes requiring a pass-
port for travel outside the United States, have, however, facilitated
the use of a passport as a means of controlling travel. 24
2. Control Over Travel
During the United States involvement in the First World War,
Congress passed the first travel control statute, the Act of May 22,
[u]ntfl further notice, no person will be allowed to go abroad from a part of the
United States without a passport either from this Department or countersigned by
the Secretary of State; nor will any person be allowed to land in the United States
without a passport from a minister or consul of the United States, or, if a foreigner,
from his government, countersigned by such minister or consul.
Freedom to Travel, supra note 15 at 8. For a discussion of war-time regulations of travel
preceding World War I, see 3 J. MooRE, supra note 8, § 532 at 1015-21.
21. For a discussion of the passport as an identity document containing a request to
foreign governments to let the traveler pass safely through their territories, see note 12 supra
and accompanying text. Prior to World War I, few Americans bothered to obtain a passport
since they were free to leave the United States without one and few foreign countries required
entering aliens to exhibit them. Ehrlich, supra note 12, at 129.
22. See 3 J. MooRE, supra note 8, §§ 495, 512.
23. See 3 J. MooRE, supra note 8, § 495, at 869. Explaining the Department of State's
decision to end the practice of American consuls giving passports to non-citizens as they had
done in the case of Italian refugees after the fall of the government of Mazzini, Secretary of
State Everett said in 1852 that "[t]he value of the passport to those entitled to it would soon
sink if it were understood that in cases of emergency it could be obtained by those who are
not entitled to it." Id. at 870. Secretary Everett also noted that he was concerned about the
credibility of the government if he were to issue a passport containing the words "citizen of
the United States" to one he knew was not a citizen. Id.
24. See Freedom to Travel, supra note 15, at 20. See also Ehrlich, supra note 12; Rauh
& Pollitt, Restrictions on the Right to Travel, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 128 (1961). Rauh and
Pollitt maintain that since World War II the United States has used the passport to further a
two-pronged project to restrict the right to travel abroad. They argue that one prong is aimed
at those individuals whose political persuasions are deemed suspect by the State Department;
the other prong denies travel facilities to designated geographical areas. Id. at 128. For a
discussion of Congressional response to the State Department's practice of imposing geo-
graphical restrictions on travel, see note 14 supra.
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1918.25 That statute, enacted in response to the prevailing social
and political climate produced by the war in Europe, made it
unlawful for United States citizens to travel abroad without a valid
passport in time of war. 26 In requiring citizens to obtain passports
for travel during wartime, Congress intended to exercise control
over entry and exit. 27  It was feared that without a means of
identifying United States citizens, non-citizens and spies could tra-
vel freely between this country and enemy nations, taking with
them sensitive military information.2 8
The 1918 Act was operative only in wartime and had to be
invoked by Presidential proclamation.2 9  In 1941 the 1918 Act was
amended so that it could be invoked during the then-existing emer-
gency.30  President Roosevelt issued a proclamation which invoked
25. Ch. 81. § 2, 40 Stat. 559 (1918).
26. The statute, entitled "An Act to prevent in time of war departure from or entry into
the United States contrary to the public safety," read:
[W]hen the United States is at war, if the President shall find . . . that restrictions
and prohibitions in addition to those provided otherwise than by this Act be im-
posed upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States,
and shall make public proclamation thereof, it shall . . . be unlawful . . .
after such proclamation. . . has been made. . . [and] is in force. . . for any
citizen of the United States to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or
enter the United States unless he bears a valid passport.
Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 559 (1918).
27. See 56 CONG. REC. 6029 (1918) (remarks of Rep. Flood). See also, 2 HYDE, INTMNA-
TIONAL LAW DIGEST §§ 405 & 406, at 1202-06 (2d rev. ed. 1947). Hyde points out that a state
engaged in war may with reason adopt extraordinary measures to control the entry into and
departure from its territories of both aliens and nationals. Id. at 1202..
28. See H.R. Rep. No. 485, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1918); 101 S. Ct. at 2776-77.
29. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. Proclamation No. 1437, 40 Stat. 1829
(1918), invoked the passport requirement of the 1918'statute. In 1926, when Congress
enacted the Passport Act which vested authority to issue passports in the Secretary of State,
passports were no longer required for travel abroad. Proclamation No. 1437 which had
triggered the requirements of the 1918 travel control statute had been terminated by the Act
of March 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359 (1921). That Act provided, "[tihat in the interpreta-
tion of any provision . . . in any Acts of Congress, joint resolutions, or proclamations of the
President containing provisions contingent upon the duration or the date of the termination
of ... [the war with Germany]. . . the date when this resolution becomes effective shall be
construed and treated as the date of the termination of the war. ... Id.
30. Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, § 1, 55 Stat. 252 (1941). The 1941 Act amended the
first paragraph of the 1918 statute as follows: "When the United States is at war or during the
existence of the national emergency proclaimed by the President on May 27, 1941 . . . and
the President shall find that the interests of the United States require . . . [travel restrictions]
. . . it shall. . . be unlawful." Id. at 252-53 (emphasis indicates language added in 1941). In
contrast to Section 215 of the INA of 1952, the 1941 Act was specific to the national
emergency declared in 1941. Compare Act of June 21, 1941 with INA § 215, 8 U.S.C. § 1185
(1976), supra note 2.
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the passport requirement of the newly amended statute, 31 and pass-
ports were again required for travel abroad. In 1952, the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act superseded the 1918 Act as amended and
made passports a requirement for citizens traveling into or out of
the United States in times of war or during the existence of any
national emergency proclaimed by the President if the President
proclaimed that such travel restrictions were necessary .32 The na-
tional emergency declared by President Truman in 1950 continued
until 1978, 33 satisfying the initial condition of the statute. Succes-
sive proclamations restricting travel in effect from 1949 to 1978
satisfied the second condition, triggering the documentation re-
quirement. 34 As noted above, the conditions precedent to invoking
the documentation requirement were eliminated in 1978, and a
blanket requirement imposed when Section 215 of the INA was
amended. 35 Thus, a passport has been required for external travel
almost continuously since World War II.
B. The 1950s Cases
The Secretary of State has long maintained that he has broad
powers in all matters relating to passports, including the power to
deny and revoke them in his discretion. 36  In the 1950s, however,
31. Proclamation No. 2523, 3 C.F.R. 115 (1941 Supp.) reprinted in 55 Stat. 1696
(1941).
32. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 215, 66 Stat. 190 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)-(b)
(1976)). See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
33. Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 71 (1950 Supp.) reprinted in 64 Stat. A454 (1950).
The national emergency proclaimed by Proclamation No. 2914 remained in effect continu-
ously until September 14, 1978 when it was terminated pursuant to section 101 of the
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
34. Proclamation No. 2850 which imposed travel controls amended Proclamation No.
2523, supra note 31, and continued to invoke the passport requirement of the 1941 statute.
Proclamation No. 2850, 3 C.F.R. 41 (1950 Supp.), reprinted in 63 Stat. 1289 (1949). In 1953,
it was revoked by Proclamation No. 3004 which invoked the passport requirement of the
INA. Proclamation No. 3004, 3 C.F.R. 301 (1953) reprinted in 67 Stat. c31 (1953). Procla-
mation No. 3004 continued in effect until the INA was amended in 1978. See note 1 supra.
35. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
36. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. In addition to claiming authority under
the Passport Act, the Secretary has claimed the he has inherent power to revoke passports. In
Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952), the Secretary contended that the
issuance and revocation of passports was a matter entirely within the realm of foreign affairs
and was thus within the absolute discretion of the Executive and through his delegation,
within the discretion of the Secretary. Id. at 448. For a discussion of the inherent powers of
the Executive and their relation to passport revocation, see notes 85, 86 & 123 infra and
accompanying text.
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the Secretary's discretion with respect to passport revocation or
denial was repeatedly challenged in the courts. 37  In reviewing
passport denials the courts evaluated the status of external travel to
determine if it was a right protected under the Constitution. In
concluding that travel abroad was a basic right, 38 the courts were
forced to examine both the purpose of a passport and the Secretary's
power, if any, to withhold passports.
The early decisions did not directly examine the source of the
Secretary's power to withhold passports; they were concerned pri-
marily with the manner in which he exercised that power. The
courts concluded that an individual whose passport application was
denied was entitled to notice of the denial and an opportunity for a
fair hearing. 39 The Secretary also had to comply with substantive,
as well as procedural, due process. 40  A notable case which illus-
trates these principles is Shachtman v Dulles.4'
In Shachtman, the plaintiff, chairman of the Independent
Socialist League,42 challenged the Secretary's refusal to issue him a
. 37. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958);
Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir.
1956); Robeson v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938
(D.C. Cir. 1955); Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955); Nathan v. Dulles, 129
F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952). The
Secretary's discretion was rarely challenged prior to the 1950s largely because passports were
not generally required for travel abroad. See Freedom to Travel, supra note 15, at 10.
38. See Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (travel abroad is a
"natural right"); Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218, 220 (D.D.C. 1955) (travel abroad is
more than a privilege, "[i]t is a right, an attribute of personal liberty"); Bauer v. Acheson,
106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952).
39. See Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D.D.C. 1955); Nathan v. Dulles, 129
F. Supp. 951, 952 (D.D.C. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451-52 (D.D.C.
1952). An individual whose passport has been denied must be given an opportunity in a
hearing to refute the evidence upon which the Secretary has relied for the denial. 136 F.
Supp. at 222.
40. See Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson,
106 F. Supp. 445, 452 (D.D.C. 1952). See also Kraus v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 840, 842 (D.C. Cir.
1956). In Kraus, plaintiff's passport application had been denied because he failed to demon-
strate that he had sufficient funds for travel abroad. Id. at 841. The district court had
dismissed plaintiff's action for declaratory judgment; the appellate court vacated the district
court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 842. The appellate court
expressed concern that the Secretary had acted arbitrarily in denying the plaintiff a passport
because on the record from the district court it did not appear that the State Department had
a practice of requiring applicants to establish financial ability to travel abroad. Id.
41. 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
42. The Independent Socialist League had been classified by the Attorney General as a
subversive organization. Id. at 942.
1981]
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passport. The Secretary had refused to issue a passport because he
had determined that granting a passport to the head of a subversive
organization would be contrary to the best interests of the United
States.4 3  The court acknowledged the relationship of the Secre-
tary's action to the conduct of foreign affairs, but rejected the
government's argument that its action was not subject to judicial
review because it was a political question. 44  The court stated that
travel abroad was a natural right which could not be abridged
without due process of law.45  The court's opinion emphasized the
interest of the individual to be free from arbitrary administrative
restraint and held that the Secretary's refusal could not be upheld
because it was arbitrary and based solely on the applicant's mem-
bership in a 'subversive' organization. 46 The court noted, too, that
a passport was "essential to the lawful departure of an American
citizen for Europe" 47 and that denial of a passport, therefore, re-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 944. The court said:
[E]ven though [Shachtman's] application might be said to come within the scope
of foreign affairs in a broad sense, it is also within the scope of the due process
clause, which is concerned with the liberty of the individual free of arbitrary
administrative restraint. There must be some reconciliation of these interests where
only the right of a particular individual to travel is involved and not a question of
foreign affairs on a political level.
Id.
45. Id. at 941.
46. Id. at 943-44. In holding that the Secretary's denial was arbitrary, the court was
primarily concerned with the use by the Secretary of a list prepared by the Attorney General
which classified the Independent Socialist League as subversive. Id. Shachtman claimed that
the Attorney General had erred in listing the International Socialist League as a subversive
organization. The Secretary did not challenge Shachtman's allegations. Thus the court found
that denial of his passport purely on the basis that Shachtman's organization was on a list
made by the Attorney General was arbitrary. Id. In other cases which involved deprivatiom
of a liberty because of membership in an organization and which were decided on due
process grounds, courts have been concerned with the absence of criteria in the regulation
linking the bare fact of membership to the individual's knowledge of, activity in or commit-
ment to the organization. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 511 (1964)
(striking down a statute which made it illegal for a member of the Communist Party to
obtain a passport. In Aptheker, the Court noted that such factors as a member's degree of
activity in and commitment to the organization were relevant to "the likelihood that travel
by such a person would be attended by the type of activity which Congress sought to
control." Id. at 510.
47. 225 F.2d at 940. The Shachtman court qualified the traditional view that a passport
was in the nature of a political document. Compare Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d at 940
(characterizing a passport as an exit permit) with Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692,
698 (1835) (passport found to be a political document by which the bearer was recognized as
a United States citizen).
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suited in a "deprivation of liberty which a citizen otherwise would
have." 48
II. KENT V. DULLES: A TEST FOR DETERMINING THE
SECRETARY'S POWER TO REVOKE PASSPORTS
A. Kent v. Dulles
Against the background of Shachtman and other 1950s pass-
port denial cases which focused on due process considerations 49
Kent v. Dulles,50 decided in 1958, is a landmark case. There the
Supreme Court firmly established the right to travel abroad as a
constitutional right; 51 it also focused on the source and extent of the
Secretary's authority to refuse passport applications. s2 Moreover,
Kent articulated a test for determining whether the circumstances
permit the Secretary to refuse a passport application.5 3
Kent v. Dulles focused on the Secretary of State's denial of a
passport application submitted by Rockwell Kent on the ground
that he was a member of the Communist Party.5 4 When notified
of his right to an administrative hearing, Kent was told that regard-
less of the outcome of the hearing, he would have to sign an
affidavit concerning any past or present membership in the Com-
munist Party.55 After the hearing, when Kent refused to supply
an affidavit, he was advised that no further action would be taken
on his passport until he complied with the Secretary's regulation.5 6
Kent sued in district court for declaratory relief; 5 7 the court granted
summary judgment for the government58 and the appellate court
affirmed. 59
48. 225 F.2d at 941.
49. See notes 39 & 40 supra.
50. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
51. Id. at 130.
52. The Kent Court said that whatever power the Secretary has to revoke passports
must be authorized by Congress. Id. at 129.
53. Id. at 127-28.
54. Id. at 117-18.
55. Id. at 118. See 22 C.F.R. § 51.142 (1958).
56. Id. at 119.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 120. On appeal, Kent's case was heard with that of Walter Briehl, a psychia-
trist whose passport was denied when he refused to supply an affidavit concerning his
membership in the Communist Party. Id. at 119.
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The Supreme Court reversed and held that neither the Pass-
port Act of 1926 nor the INA authorized the Secretary to deny
passports on the grounds of the applicant's political beliefs or associ-
ations. 0 The Court acknowledged that the Passport Act had long
been interpreted as granting the Secretary broad discretion with
respect to the issuance of passports, 6' but refused to find in such
discretion the power to withhold a passport . 2  The Court's deci-
sion rests on the premise that the Secretary's power to deny or
revoke a passport is not inherent but stems from the authority
granted to him by Congress in the Passport Act.6 3  Because the
Passport Act contains no express delegation of authority to revoke
passports, such power, if it exists, must be implied. Recognizing
that important constitutional rights are involved in the question of
passport denial, the Court held that the Passport Act should be
narrowly construed. The Court believed that it would be impru-
dent to "impute to Congress, when in 1952 it made a passport
necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of
the Secretary of State, a purpose to give unbridled discretion to
grant or withhold a passport for any substantial reason he may
choose. '6 4  Only where the Secretary could show a consistent and
substantial practice of denying passports for a particular reason
would the Court imply from congressional acquiescence, the au-
thority to deny a passport for that reason.65 The Court discerned
only two situations where the Secretary had consistently refused to
issue passports: (1) where the applicant was not a citizen of the
United States"6 and (2) where the applicant was engaged in illegal
conduct.6 7
60. Id. at 130.
61. Id. at 124-25.
62. Id. at 125.
63. The Court focused on the extent to which, if any, Congress had authorized curtail-
ment of the right to travel, id, at 127, and implicitly rejected the argument that revocation of
passports in this case fell within the Secretary's power to conduct foreign affairs. Id. at 129.
The Kent Court stated that the case did not involve a political question. Id.
64. Id. at 128.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 127. Citizenship has always been a prerequisite to the issuance of a passport.
See notes 12 & 23 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, revocation on grounds of lack of
citizenship does not entitle the individual to administrative review. See 22 C.F.R. § 51.80
(1981). Allegiance to the United States has also been a factor in determining a person's
eligibility for a passport. See 357 U.S. at 127; 3 J. Moopx, supra note 8, at § 513.
67. 357 U.S. at 127. For a discussion of the history of denying passports because the
applicant was engaged in illegal conduct, see 3 J. Moons, supra note 8, at § 512; 3 C.
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Kent is important because in it the Court recognized that in
controlling external travel, constitutional rights other than the right
to travel might be abridged.68 The regulation at issue in Kent
permitted the Secretary to curtail an individual's freedom of move-
ment solely because of his refusal to be subjected to inquiry con-
cerning his political beliefs and associations. 69 Thus, it not only
allowed the Secretary to abridge the right to travel, but it also
forced an individual to choose between exercising his right to travel
abroad or exercising his first amendment rights to believe what he
will and associate with whom he chooses. By forcing the applicant
to make this choice, the regulation served to inhibit or punish the
exercise of first amendment rights.70 It is precisely because travel
control could also be used to inhibit or punish the exercise of first
amendment rights that the Court in Kent v. Dulles insisted on a
narrow construction of the Secretary's delegated powers under the
Passport Act.
B. Construction of Power Delegated Under the Passport Act
Implicit in the Kent Court's analysis is a presumption against
recognizing any statutorily-implied power in the Secretary to re-
voke or deny a passport. 71 Under the decision, when the Secretary
wishes to use discretionary power, or when such a use is challenged,
he must show that Congress has implicitly authorized him to revoke
passports in such cases based on its acquiescence in the Secretary's
past practice of exercising that power. 72  The Kent Court's reluc-
tance to read into the Passport Act the power to withhold passports
HACKWORTH, supra note 7, § 268, at 500. Department of State regulations direct that a
passport will not be issued to an applicant who is the subject of an outstanding federal
warrant of arrest or who is the subject of a subpoena in a matter involving a federal
prosecution for, or grand jury investigation of, a felony. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(a)(1), (a)(5)
(1981).
68. 357 U.S. at 130. See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). In Zemel, the Court
upheld a regulation of the Secretary which provided that a passport would not be issued to
one whose stated destination was Cuba. The Court distinguished Kent, stating that the
regulation restricting travel to Cuba did not interfere with first amendment rights. Id. at 16.
For a discussion of the Secretary's practice of denying passports for travel to designated
geographical areas, see note 14 supra and accompanying text.
69. 357 U.S. at 130.
70. For a discussion of how inhibition of first amendment rights damages constitutional
values, see notes 134 & 136 infra and accompanying text.
71. See Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766, 2788 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
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reflects its concern that any restrictions on constitutional rights be
rooted in legislative acts of Congress rather than discretionary acts
of an administrator whose power to abridge such rights is unclear.73
This principle of construing delegated power narrowly is in
part a correlary to the separation of powers doctrine embodied in
the Constitution. 74  The Constitution gives to the legislative branch
the power to make laws; 75 the Congress must necessarily formulate
the policy under which those laws are to be carried out.76  The
courts have long held that the Constitution permits Congress to
delegate the function of implementing its laws and carrying out its
policy. 77 But, to ensure that Congress does not abdicate its law-
making function, it has been held that delegated authority must be
narrowly defined and limited in scope. 78  Laws passed by Congress
must reflect legislative policy and contain sufficient standards for
implementation so that the delegate may make rules and determi-
73. 357 U.S. at 129.
74. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTIONAL LAW 284-91 (1978); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967)
(Brennan, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion in United States v. Robel, Justice
Brennan said, "Formulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it
by the electorate, and to the extent Congress delegates authority under indefinite standards,
this policy-making function is passed on to other agencies, often not answerable or responsive
in the same degree to the people." Id. at 276.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8, cl. 18.
76. See note 74 supra.
77. United States v. Rock Royal Coop, 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939); Currin v. Wallace,
306 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1939); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S.
194, 215 (1912); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911); Union Bridge Co. v.
United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385-88 (1907); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904);
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 690-91 (1892); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43
(1825).
78. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Panama Refining was the first
case in which the Court invalidated a congressional delegation. L. TRIBE, supra note 74 at
287 n.10. In Panama Refining the Court struck down § 9(c) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act which authorized the President to prohibit transportation in interstate and
foreign commerce of petroleum produced in excess of the amount permitted under state law.
293 U.S. at 414-15, 433. The Court stated that § 9(c) contained no expression of legislative
policy; nor did it indicate why Congress chose to allow the President to prohibit the transpor-
tation of "hot oil." Id. at 418. The Court found that § 9(c) set no criteria to govern the
President's course. Rather, "[t]he Congress left the matter to the President without standard
or rule, to be dealt with as he pleased." Id. The section constituted an invalid delegation
because it authorized "such a breadth of... action as essentially to commit to the President
the functions of a legislature rather than those of an executive or administrative officer
executing a declared legislative policy." Id. at 418-19. See also Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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nations of fact that are consistent with the legislature's intent. 79
Regulations issued by a delegate are valid only as rules subordinate
to legislative policy; they cannot substitute for laws. 80
It has been suggested that in the realm of foreign affairs, the
standards for delegating authority are less strict than those applica-
ble to legislation pertaining to domestic affairs.81 Proponents of
79. See Panama Ref. Co. v. United States, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935). That legislation should reflect a policy
and contain standards for its implementation is especially important where constitutional
rights may be involved. See L. TRaBE, supra note 74 at 288-91; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
129 (1958); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 139-40 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Barenblatt, Justice Black said,
"[where] governmental procedures... reach to the very fringes of congressional power...
more is required of -the legislatures than a vague delegation to be filled in later by mute
acquiscence." Id. (footnote omitted).
80. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 428-29 (1935). See Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 20 (1965), where Black in his dissenting opinion said:
[s]ince Article I, however, vests 'All legislative Powers' in the Congress, and no
language in the Constitution purports to vest any such power in the President, it
necessarily follows, if the Constitution is to control, that the President is completely
devoid of power to make laws regulating passports or anything else. And he has no
more power to make laws by labelling them regulations than to do so by calling
them laws.
Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
81. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 96, 118-20 (1972). The
case most often cited to support broad delegations in the field of foreign affairs is United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). There, the Court upheld a Joint
Resolution, Act of May 28, 1934, ch. 365, 48 Stat. 811, which made it unlawful to sell arms
and munitions to persons acting on behalf of the countries involved in the Chaco conflict if
the President determined that such a prohibition would contribute to the re-establishment of
peace between the countries involved in that conflict. In determining whether the delegation
to the President was valid, the Court examined the nature of the powers of the federal
government in foreign and domestic affairs, 299 U.S. 315-21, and concluded that "[tihe
whole aim of the [Joint] Resolution [was] to affect a situation [which was] entirely external to
the United States" and one which fell within the category of foreign affairs. Id. at 315
(emphasis added). The case articulates the principle that the foreign affairs power of the
government stems not from the Constitution, but from the concept of national sovereignty.
See id. at 318; L. HENKIN, supra, at 19-24. Justice Sutherland wrote in Curtiss-Wright that
participation in the exercise of the [foreign affairs] power is significantly limited
[.. (as contrasted with the domestic affairs power].
... It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such
an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations. ...
299 U.S. at 319-20 (emphasis added).
For a discussion of Curtiss-Wright which does not endorse expansive delegations in the realm
of foreign affairs and which proposes that the President has no independent power in this
regard, see Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 131, 138-47 (1971).
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this view, recognizing that in the area of domestic affairs, the
Constitution makes the Executive's role ancillary to that of the
legislature, 82 argue that in foreign affairs greater leeway should be
given to the Executive. 83 In part this view rests on the premise that
the Executive has inherent power to conduct foreign affairs 4 and
thus any congressional delegation of foreign affairs power to the
Executive is perfunctory since they were his to exercise anyway on
his own constitutional authority. 85 However, the Kent decision
82. L. TRIBE, supra note 74, at 161.
83. See L. HENKIN, supra note 81, at 119; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). The
Court in Zemel said:
because of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international
relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information which
cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature,
Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs-must
of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic
areas.
Id.
84. See L. HENKIN, supra note 81, at 37-54; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
85. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 320. The power of
the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations
"does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." Id. But see Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In Youngstown, steel companies challenged the
authority of the President to order the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate the
nation's steel mills which had been threatened to be closed by a labor strike. The President
ordered the seizure because he believed that a shutdown of the mills would jeopardize the
national security. The government contended that the President's power to seize the mills
should be implied from his "aggregate ... powers under the Constitution." Id. at 587. The
Court held that the President had exceeded his authority. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Jackson noted that "Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." Id. at 635. Accordingly, he set out the
following scheme to describe when the President's authority is at its maximum and when it is
at its minimum:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial
of authority, he can rely only upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only on
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional power of Congress over the
matter.
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quite correctly suggests that such an intepretation is not permissible
where delegated power impinges on individual rights. 86
Because travel abroad is a constitutional right8 7 and passports
affect an individual's ability to exercise that right, revocation or
refusal to issue passports cannot be premised on the Executive's
inherent power to conduct foreign affairs.88 Delegations of power
which affect constitutional rights, even if in the area of foreign
affairs, must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that those rights are
not abridged except pursuant to constitutional congressional stat-
utes.89 Even if legislative policy is clear, failure to state standards
for its application reflects a failure on the part of the legislature to
Id. at 635, 637. Justice Jackson noted that the question presented in Curtiss-Wright involved
the President's power to act in accord with an express grant of authority from Congress, and
that therefore his powers were at their maximum. See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S.
Ct. 2972, 2981, 2983 (1981).
86. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 129-30. The Kent Court determined that travel
abroad was a liberty under the fifth amendment and stated that "if that right is to be
regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress." Id. at 129
(citing Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)), See also, L. TRIBE, supra note 74, at
166; L. HENKIN, supra note 81, at 119-20. Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 21 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting) (Justice Black stated that the President has no inherent authority to make
regulations governing the issuance and use of passports).
87. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 129 (1958). Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Shachtman v. Dulles, 225
F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218, 220 (D.D.C. 1955);
Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952).
88. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 21 (Black, J., dissenting); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 518 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129
(1958). The cases upholding the Secretary's denial of a passport because the applicant's stated
destination was to an area designated by the Secretary as restricted for travel appear to rest in
large measure on the inherent power of the Executive to conduct foreign affairs. See Worthy
v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959); MacEwan v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 306, 308
(D.D.C. 1964) (The court in MacEwan said, "[i]t would be a serious restriction of the
presidential authority to conduct foreign affairs to deny to him and his authorized subordi-
nates the power to prevent travel by curious citizens to countries where their presence might
jeoparidze the relations of the United States with foreign countries." Id. at 308 (footnotes
omitted)). The Supreme Court in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), however, makes it clear
that the Secretary's authority to refuse to issue passports for travel to designated areas is
implied from congressional acquiescence in the consistent application of the Secretary's
practice of imposing travel restrictions. Id. at 10-12. See also Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940
(D.C. Cir. 1967). There the Court, cutting back somewhat on the Zemel decision, held that
the Secretary could not deny a passport because the applicant had failed to give assurances
that he would not travel to a restricted area. Id. at 945, 947. For a discussion of Lynd v. Rusk
and Congress' response to the Secretary's practice of imposing geographical restrictions on
travel, see note 14 supra.
89. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 129; Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d at 945. See note 79 supra
and accompanying text.
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articulate a judgment as to the scope of the policy and the extent to
which it should be applied.90
III. HAIG V. AGEE: THE "'POLICY TEST" AND
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. The Facts
On December 23, 1979, the Secretary of State revoked the
passport of Philip Agee, a United States citizen living in West
Germany,9' pursuant to a determination by the Secretary that
Agee's activities abroad were causing "serious damage to the na-
tional security or the foreign policy of the United States."9' 2  In a
letter notifying Agee of the action taken with respect to his pass-
port, the Secretary stated that his determination was based on
Agee's stated intention to disrupt the intelligence operations of the
United States. 3
90. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 269 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring). In
Robel, the Court struck down § 5(a)(1)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,
64 Stat. 992 (1950), which provided that when a Communist organization was registered it
would be unlawful for any member of the organization to work in a defense facility. Justice
Brennan disagreed with the majority's finding that the section was overbroad on its face. His
concurring opinion focused instead on the lack of standards provided in the delegation of
power to the Secretary of Defense to designate defense facilities under the Act. "The failure to
provide adequate standards [for designating defense facilities. . . reflects Congress' failure to
have made a 'legislative judgment', Cantwell v. Conn,, 310 U.S. at 307, on the extent to
which the prophylactic measure should be applied." Id. at 275-76 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91. 101 S. Ct. at 2769-71.
92. Id. at 2771. Department of State regulations provide that a passport may be revoked
in any case where "the Secretary determines that the national's activities abroad are causing
or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the
United States .... "22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1981). See id. § 51.71(a). It was on the basis of
these regulations that Agee lost his passport.
93. 101 S. Ct. 2771. Agee, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
resigned from the CIA in 1968. Id. at 2770. At a 1974 press conference in London, he
announced that he was embarking on a campaign to fight the United States intelligence
agency wherever it was operating, to expose its officers and agents, and to "take the measures
necessary to drive them out of countries where they are operating." Id. at 2770 n.2. In
furtherance of his campaign, Agee made personal appearences, held press conferences
around the world and published exposes of the CIA and its agents. See Agee v. Muskie, 629
F.2d 80, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1980); P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY (1975); DmTY
WoRK: THE CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE (P. AGEE & L. WULF eds. 1978).
The Supreme Court recognized the lower courts' suggestions that the Secretary's revoca-
tion of Agee's passport may have been prompted by the Iranian hostage cirsis. 101 S. Ct. at
2771 n.8. See also Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729, 732 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Agee
v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 84 n.3, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In his dissent from the court of appeals'
decision, Judge MacKinnon referred to a newspaper article that reported that Agee has been
1981] PASSPORT REVOCATION
Agee declined his right to an administrative appeal9 4 and filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
for declaratory and injunctive relief.9 5 He alleged that the revoca-
tion was invalid because the regulation on which it was based was
not authorized by Congress"6 and was unconstitutional because it
infringed first and fifth amendment rights.9 7  For purposes of test-
ing the validity of the regulation Agee conceded that his activities
were causing serious damage to the national security or foreign
policy of the United States.9 8 The district court held that the
regulation was not authorized by Congress 9 and that therefore the
Secretary had acted without authority in revoking Agee's pass-
port. 00 The court reasoned that any power the Secretary had to
revoke passports derives from Congress' 0' and that, absent an ex-
press delegation of authority to the Secretary in the Passport Act,
any such authority must be found to be implied.10 2  The court
noted that in this case particular care was warranted in construing
invited to Iran to participate in a tribunal to judge the hostages taken in the seizure of the
United States embassy in Teheran. 629 F.2d at 90. Agee denied having been invited to Iran.
Id. at 81 n. 1. The district court noted in its opinion that if Agee's activities were deemed to be
detrimental to the hostages in Iran, a special statute, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976), may have
given the President extraordinary authority to revoke Agee's passport as part of an attempt to
effectuate the release of citizens imprisoned by a foreign government. 629 F.2d at 732.
94. 483 F. Supp. at 730. Any person whose passport has been revoked by the Secretary
can require the Secretary to establish the basis for the revocation before a hearing officer. 22
C.F.R. § 51.81 (1981). The person so affected is entitled to be informed of all of the evidence
before the hearing officer. 22 C.F.R. § 51.85 (1981). See Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218
(D.D.C. 1955), in which the court held that the Secretary may not withhold confidential
information on which he based his determination not to issue a passport. On appeal, the
court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings on factual matters and
expressly declined to consider the propriety of the Secretary's use of confidential information.
235 F.2d 532 (1956).
95. 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980).
96. Id. at 730.
97. Id.
98. 483 F. Supp. at 730. Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Haig v. Agee notes
that Agee's concession that his activities fell within the scope of the regulation was solely for
the purpose of testing the facial validity of the regulation and not its application in his case.
101 S. Ct. at 2784, 2788 n.10.
99. 483 F. Supp. at 732. In finding that Congress had not authorized the regulation, the
court stated that "[liegislative silence cannot be read as implicit adoption of an obscure,
virtually unused regulation that limits the free exercise of protected rights. . . . The [c]ourt is
forced to conclude that the Secretary's promulgation of the challenged regulation was with-
out authorization from Congress." Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 730.
102. Id. at 731.
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the Secretary's authority because the regulation permits him to take
action against an individual. 10 3  Relying on the practice test
articulated in Kent v Dulles 0 4 the court held that the Secretary had
not established a practice of revoking passports on the grounds
specified in the regulation sufficient to warrant a finding of Con-
gressional authorization to revoke on those grounds.10 5 The court
of appeals affirmed 106 the district court, and certiorari was granted
by the Supreme Court. 107
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and upheld the
validity of the regulation. 08  The Court held that the policy an-
nounced in the challenged regulation was "sufficiently substantial
and consistent" to compel the conclusion that Congress had ap-
proved it. 09 Having found that the regulation was authorized by
Congress, the Court held further that Agee's constitutional
claims"o were without merit."'
103. Id. at 730-31.
104. 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958). The consistent and substantial administrative practice
test has been used by courts since Kent to determine whether the Secretary has the power to
revoke or deny a passport. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, reh. denied, 382 U.S. 873
(1965); Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F.
Supp. 974, 985 (D.D.C. 1972), af'd, 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973). According to Zemel
the 1926 Act only authorizes those refusals which "it could fairly be argued were adopted by
Congress in light of prior administrative practice." 381 U.S. at 18, quoting Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. at 128.
105. 483 F. Supp. at 731.
106. 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
107. 101 S. Ct. 69 (1981).
108. 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981).
109. Id. at 2781.
110. Agee claimed that the Secretary's revocation of his passport violated his first
amendment right to criticize government policies and that failure to grant him a pre-revoca-
tion hearing violated his fifth amendment right to procedural due process. Id. at 2781. Agee
claimed, too, that the regulation was unconstitutional on its face because it was overbroad.
See notes 128-46 infra and accompanying text. The Court never directly considered this
question. In a footnote, the Court notes that the district court held that since Agee's conduct
fell within the core of the regulation, he lacked standing to challenge the regulation for being
overbroad. Id. at 2783 n.61. But see 2788 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. 101 S. Ct. at 2781. The Court held that the right to travel abroad with a "letter of
introduction" in the form of a passport was subordinate to national security and foreign
policy considerations. 101 S. Ct. at 2781. Reasoning that because national security is a
compelling governmental interest, and that secrecy of foreign intelligence operations serve
those interests, the Court rejected Agee's claim that the Secretary's regulation impermissibly
restricted his freedom to travel. Id. at 2782. The Court also held that Agee's claim that
revocation of his passport was intended to penalize his first amendment right to criticize the
government was without merit. Id. at 2783. To reach this conclusion the Court distinguished
between speech and conduct. Analogizing Agee's disclosures about the CIA to publication of
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In setting out a framework for determining whether the, Pass-
port Act gives authority to the Secretary to revoke passports on
national security or foreign policy grounds, the Court focused on
the Executive's inherent authority in matters relating to national
security and foreign policy." 2 The Court observed that since the
Passport Act granted broad rule-making authority to the Execu-
tive" 3 and since Congress was silent on the extent of the Secretary's
power under the Act,"14 courts should follow a consistent adminis-
trative construction of the statute." 5
The Court also examined the history of the Passport Act
against the background of the travel control statute of 1918. 1
Interpreting the 1926 Passport Act, the Court concluded that Con-
gress necessarily included therein the power to revoke passports on
the ground of national security because failure to have done so
would have frustrated the purpose of the 1918 statute. ' 7 The Agee
Court's analysis is flawed, however, because the Court overlooked
the fact that in 1926 a passport was not required for travel abroad.
The 1918 statute provided that passports would be required in time
of war and then only when the President proclaimed travel restric-
tions necessary.118  In 1926 the nation was not at war and the
the sailing dates of military transports or the number and location of military troops, the
Court held that his activities were not protected by the Constitution. Id. As to Agee's claim
that revocation prior to a hearing violated his fifth amendment right to due process, the
Court stated that where there is a likelihood of severe damage to national security or foreign
policy, the government is not required to hold a pre-revocation hearing. Id.
112. See 101 S. Ct. at 2774. Implicit in the Court's approach to construction of the
Passport Act is the idea that issuance of passports involves the foreign affairs power of the
Executive. In its analysis the Court noted that "the President is the sole organ of the nation in
its foreign affairs." Id. (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319 (1936)). For a discussion of Curtiss-Wright, see note 81 and accompanying text. The
Agee Court also stated that "Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of
foreign affairs-must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that customarily wielded
in domestic areas." 101 S. Ct. at 2774, (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)), and
further, that matters of foreign policy are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention. 101
S. Ct. at 2774. For a discussion of the principle that Congressional delegations in the field of
foreign affairs should be construed broadly and a criticism of that approach, see note 85 infra
and accompanying text.
113. 101 S. Ct. at 2774.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2776-77.
117. Id. at 2776.
118. Id. at 2777. The Agee Court concluded that the purpose of the 1918 Act authoriz-
ing travel controls was to protect the national security. Id. at 2776. (citing Act of May 22,
1918, ch. 81, §§ 1-2, 40 Stat. 559). See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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Presidential proclamation which invoked the passport requirement
of the 1918 Act had lapsed." 9 There is little in the legislative
history of the 1926 Act which would indicate that Congress in-
tended the Secretary to have power to withhold passports during
peacetime. 20 Indeed, in 1978 when the INA was amended to
require passports during peacetime,' 2' the Passport Act was
amended to expressly limit to wartime the Secretary's power to
impose geographical restrictions on travel, one basis upon which he
had relied to withhold passports in the past. 22
The Agee Court, in reading into the Passport Act the power to
revoke on grounds of national security, revitalizes the idea that the
Secretary's power stems from inherent Executive powers in the area
of foreign affairs. 2 3  In reviving that theory the Court ignored the
119. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. As the title of the 1918 Act suggests, it
was as much concerned with the safety of United States travelers during wartime as with
national security. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, the safety of United
States travelers provided the impetus for amending Section 215 of the INA in 1978. See 124
Cong. Rec. H4689-90 (daily ed. May 31, 1978) (remarks of Reps. Eilberg and Fish). The
passport requirement would have lapsed when President Truman's 1950 proclamation of
national emergency was terminated on September 14, 1978 pursuant to the National Emer-
gencies Act. See note 33 supra. In proposing the amendment which was subsequently
adopted, Representative Eilberg said that "[t]he thrust of [the] amendment is to facilitate
travel, not to obstruct it and cover it with penal overtones." 124 Cong. Rec. H4689, supra.
120. The legislative history on the Passport Act of 1926 makes no mention of passport
revocation. The purpose of the Act appears to have been threefold: (1) to facilitate the
issuance of passports by enabling such foreign representatives of the United States govern-
ment as consuls and vice-consuls designated by the Secretary of State to issue passports; (2) to
facilitate refunds of erroneously collected passport fees; and (3) to validate passports issued to
United States teachers for a four-year period instead of the usual two-year period. See H.R.
Rep. No. 1358, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); 67 Cong. Rec. 11705-06. See also 44 Stat. 887
(1926).
121. See note 2 supra.
122. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (Supp. III 1979) (codifying the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 94-426, 92 Stat. 971 (1978)).
123. See note 112 supra and accompanying text. See also Bauer v Acheson, 106 F. Supp.
445, 448 (D.D.C. 1952) (where the Secretary contended that the issuance and revocation
were entirely within the realm of foreign affairs and as such within the absolute discretion of
the Executive branch of the government under its inherent power); Hearings on Caps in
Internal Security Laws Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Inter-
nal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (June 30, 1966) (remarks of S. J. Tracy). Mr. Tracy said that while
"statutory authority to grant or withhold a passport was vested in the Secretary of State by
the Congress over 100 years ago ... the exercise of discretion in the issuance of passports is
actually grounded in the power over foreign relations placed in the Executive by the Consti-
tution." That Congress amended the Passport Act in 1978 to prohibit the Secretary from
imposing geographical restrictions on travel except in time of war refutes the idea that the
Secretary's power to revoke a passport during peacetime derives from the Executive's inher-
ent power to conduct foreign affairs. See notes 14 & 88 supra and accompanying text.
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rationale underlying its decision in Kent v. Dulles and the prevail-
ing view that where constitutional rights are involved, delegated
power must be sufficiently specific to ensure that it is being exer-
cised in a manner consistent with legislative policy. 124
What is perhaps most startling about Agee is that the Court,
without acknowledging the import of its own action rejected the
practice test and substituted in its place a test based on executive
policy.12 5 Under the policy test, the Secretary need not show that
he has consistently applied the power he claims to have but merely
that he has consistently asserted it. 126 In other words, he no longer
has to point to a number of cases in which he actually revoked
passports for a particular reason; he may instead rely on his own
long-standing claim to that power. The Court in Agee failed to
consider that the Secretary's regulation as it is written affects not
only the right to travel but first amendment rights as well. 12 7  The
regulation, construed according to the policy test is thus open to
criticism as being overbroad. Although the majority ignores this
criticism which is raised in the dissenting opinion, it is strikingly
similar to the arguments raised in a series of cases twenty and thirty
years ago.
In the late 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court struck down a
number of laws on the ground that they were overbroad. 128  In
United States v. Robel, 129 the Court struck down a provision of the
124. See notes 79 & 89 supra and accompanying text.
125. See 101 S. Ct. at 2785 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In responding to Agee's argument
that Kent v. Dulles required a consistent practice by the Secretary, the Court said that the
regulation in Kent had been struck down because the Secretary had never applied it consist-
ently; absent a consistent application the Court said that in Kent it could ascertain no
definitive administrative policy in which Congress could be said to have acquiesced. 101 S.
Ct. at 2780. By contrast, in Agee the Court found a consistent policy and stated that the
government could not be faulted for not having had a previous opportunity to apply the
regulation. Id. While the majority succeeded in distinguishing Kent, Justices Brennan and
Marshall in dissent were compelled to conclude that the court's decision overruled Kent v.
Dulles sub silentio. Id. at 2788 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, in his concurring
opinion, thought that the majority was cutting back on Kent. Id. at 2786 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
126. Id. at 2780.
127. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
128. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963). Cf. American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (where the
Court upheld Section 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308
(1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940).
129. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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Subversive Activities Control Act which made it a crime for any
member of the Communist Party to work in a defense facility.130
The Court reasoned that although the statute was directed at em-
ployment, it also affected first amendment freedoms.'31 In finding
the statute overbroad, the Court expressed concern with the chill-
ing effect it had on the freedom of political beliefs and associations
guaranteed by the first amendment. 32  Even where the statute did
not infringe directly on an individual's rights, the fact that its
prohibitions rested on political association inhibited the exercize of
those rights. 133 A statute's overbreadth damages constitutional
values because it operates on the minds of would-be actors. 34 Ab-
sent guidelines, the actors do not know the limits of the law and
might therefore confine their activities far within the circumscribed
area for fear of overstepping its bounds. 35  In this way, overbroad
130. Id. at 260-61. In Robel the Court struck down § 5(a)(l)(D) of the Subversive
Activities Control Act, Pub. L. No. 831, § 5(a)(1)(D), 64 Stat. 987 (1950).
131. Id. at 265.
132. Id. The Court recognized that the government had a not insubstantial interest in
the statute and that its purpose was to reduce the threat of sabotage and espionage in the
nation's defense plants. However, the Court expressed concern about the means by which the
government had attempted to achieve its purpose:
[i]t cannot be doubted that the means chosen to implement the governmental
purpose in this instance cut deeply into the right of association. Section 5(a)(1)(D)
put appellee to the choice of surrendering his organizational affiliation, regardless of
whether his membership threatened the security of a defense facility, or giving up
his job.
Id. at 264-65 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted that the right to employment free
from governmental interference was within the liberty of the fifth amendment. Id. at 265
n.11.
133. Id. at 265.
134. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844, 856
(1970). In that note, the author explains how the 'chilling effect' operates:
[f]irst, and most obviously, a 'chilling effect' is the constitutional vice of overbroad
coverage. By definition, an overbroad statute covers privileged activity [i.e. the
exercise of first amendment rights], and to the extent that the statutory burden
operates as a disincentive to action the result is an in terrorem effect on conduct
within the protection of the first amendment. The reason for invalidating a substan-
tially overbroad law is to end its deterrence of constitutionally preferred activity.
Id. at 853.
135. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
An overbroad statute does not discriminate between activity which may be proscribed and
that which cannot be so proscribed consistent with first amendment right. United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. at 266. The absence of guidelines affects not only the person who, in fact,
engages in non-constitutionally protected activity, but all persons. As Justice Black points out
in his dissent in Barenblatt:
[A] statute broad enough to support infringement of speech [and] writings . . .
against the unequivocal command of the First Amendment necessarily leaves all
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regulation fails to give adequate notice to the actor of what is being
proscribed. 13 6
The rationale of the overbreadth doctrine is applicable to the
regulation at issue in Agee because the Passport Act contains no
express authorization to revoke and deny passports and Congress
has established no regulations to guide its enforcement. 37  The
Secretary himself promulgates not only the regulations and stand-
ards (in this case "serious damage to national security or foreign
policy") 38 by which he can revoke a passport, but he also deter-
mines the cases in which he will exercise his discretion to do so.' 39
persons to guess just what the law really means to cover, and fear of a wrong guess
inevitably leads people to forego the very rights the Constitution sought to protect
above all others.
360 U.S. at 137 (footnote omitted). Thus, lacking notice of just what the overbroad law
means to cover, people may confine their activities to stay within the bounds of the law. This
is an illustration of the 'chilling effect'. See note 134 supra.
136. See note 135 supra. See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). In
Watkins, the Court reversed a conviction for contempt of Congress. Watkins had been called
to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee. While he freely answered
questions concerning his associations with the Communist Party, he refused to answer
questions pertaining to the Communist activities of people on a list which the committee
compiled and on which it sought to examine him. Therefore, the committee cited him for
contempt. The Court examined the broad grant of authority to investigate un-American
activities and noted that the delegation contained no standards for determining the scope of
the committee's authority to make inquiries concerning un-American activities. Id. at 201-09.
In reversing the conviction, the Court stated that the person who is compelled to make a
choice between answering and not answering was entitled to knowledge on the subject to
which the interrogation was pertinent and held that Watkins had been denied a fair opportu-
nity for determining whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer the committee's
questions. Id. at 208-209, 215.
137. The lack of legislative standards to guide the revocation of passports on grounds of
national security underscores the imprudence of reading into the Passport Act congressional
authorization to revoke on those grounds. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. at 274-77
(Brennan, J., concurring) and note 90 supra.
The Passport Act does not address the question whether the Secretary may revoke
passports on the grounds of national security. The Agee Court's readiness to find congressio-
nal authorization to support the Secretary's revocation of Agee's passport overlooks the fact
that there has been no expression of congressional judgment on the extent to which national
security considerations should curtail travel, nor any establishment of guidelines delineating
the scope of the Secretary's power to revoke passports on those grounds. See Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. at 130. Thus it is premature for the Court, in dismissing Agee's claim that the
Secretary's regulation unconstitutionally curtails his right to travel, to state that the govern-
ment's interest in national security outweighs Agee's right to travel with a passport. The
legislature has established no criteria as to the scope of the power to revoke passports on
national security grounds by which the court could balance the interests involved. Compare
101 S. Ct. at 2781-82 with United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. at 263 n.20.
138. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1981).
139. See 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b) (1981).
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The problem inherent in the Agee Court's policy test is that
even if the Passport Act did authorize passport revocation on na-
tional security grounds, Congress has not supplied guidelines for
determining what is to be considered serious damage to national
security. The Agee Court sidestepped the constitutional issue inher-
ent in regulating travel by distinguishing between speech and
action. 40  The Court states that speech and beliefs are only part of
Agee's campaign to disrupt the activities of the CIA and that he has
jeopardized the security of the United States.' 4' However, the
Court points to no conduct on Agee's part other than his speech and
publications. The Court's decision reveals that serious damage to
the national security or foreign policy is sustained when the holder
of a passport is publishing information on United States intelligence
operations.142  How different is this from a determination by the
Secretary that membership in the Communist Party will cause
serious damage to the national security of the United States if for
example the passport applicant's stated intention is to travel to the
Soviet Union? "3 Because it is impossible for anyone to know what
140. 101 S. Ct. at 2783. The Court relied on Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), to
support this distinction, stating that to the extent revocation operated to inhibit Agee it
would inhibit only his action. 101 S. Ct. at 2783 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1965). The Court's reliance on Zemel is, however, misplaced. While the Zemel Court cited
Kent's practice test with approval, 381 U.S. at 17-18, it also emphasized that petitioner's
stated purpose for travelling to Cuba-gathering of information-was not a freedom within
the first amendment's protection. Id. at 17. For a further discussion of Zemel v. Rusk and of
the Secretary's practice with respect to geographic restrictions on travel, see notes 14 & 88
supra and accompanying text.
141. 101 S. Ct. at 2783.
142. See id. at 2782-83.
143. In Kent v. Dulles, the Court struck down a regulation of the Secretary which
allowed him to deny passports to Communists. 357 U.S. at 130. The present regulation,
however, enables the Secretary to do just this if he determines that a member of a communist
organization traveling to the U.S.S.R. would damage national security. The Agee Court's
decision upholds the Secretary's discretion to determine what constitutes serious damage to
national security without having a legislative judgment on the extent to which the Secretary
may exercise that discretion. In so doing, the decision opens the door to abuse of discretion.
See note 137 supra. With no guidelines as to what constitutes serious damage to national
security, the Courts are not in a position to weigh the competing interests of the individual
and the state. See 83 HARv. L. Rv. at 857. See generally United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. at
277 (Brennan, J., concurring). Cf. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962)
where the Court held that Congress did not authorize the Postmaster General to censor
obscenity when it made it a crime to send "nonmailable" material through the mails. Id. at
479. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan said that in a case where the extent of the
authority delegated by Congress is unclear, and finding such authority would raise constitu-
tional questions, it is better to find that no such authority was granted. Id. at 500.
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activities the Secretary will deem likely to cause serious damage to
national security, 44 a would-be traveler does not have adequate
notice of what activities will cause him to risk losing his passport. 1 4
The policy test which the Court espouses in Agee v. Haig
makes it easier to find in any given case that Congress has autho-
rized the Secretary to refuse to revoke passports. The Court's deci-
sion is flawed because it does not examine the standards by which
the Secretary's policy is implemented. 46 The Court has bowed to
the Secretary's discretion at the expense of a serious inquiry into the
constitutional rights which may be affected by the exercise of that
discretion.
CONCLUSION
Freedom to travel abroad is a complex constitutional right
which cannot be wholly distinguished from the freedoms guaren-
teed under the first amendment. Because the Passport Act is
broadly phrased and grants no express power to revoke or deny a
passport, the test which governs revocation or denial of a passport is
of great import to all citizens. The practice test articulated in Kent
v. Dulles provided a means by which a court could uphold passport
revocation and at the same time assure due consideration for Con-
stitutional rights. The policy test articulated by the Supreme Court
in Agee removes a safeguard provided by Kent to ensure that those
rights were being regulated and enforced with the approval of the
legislature. The practice test's requirement that the Secretary show
a past application of his claimed power to revoke a passpart served
as a check on "unbridled" administrative discretion.147 The Agee
Court's policy test, in contrast, opens the door to abuse of discre-
tion. Moreover, the implication of national security considerations
establishes a precedent which may discourage future judicial re-
view of passport revocations. 48
Joy Beane
144. See note' 14 supra and accompanying text.
145. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
146. See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
147. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 129.
148. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
19811

